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Abstract. Intense rainfall and flood are known to be the principal natural cause of 
onshore landslides. Early warning systems are in place to minimize negative effects 
of landslides surveying natural hazard events, damages and emergency response 
actions. The focus of this study is to improve the early warning landslides systems 
and associated systems and components, including resource management, 
environmental impact analysis, and environmental planning. This study is part of 
the main project « Klima 2050 » that aims to the reduction of the societal risks 
associated with climate changes and enhanced precipitation and flood water 
exposure within the built environment. This paper infers on the applicability and 
suitability to some forensic analysis techniques to specific landslides events and to 
early warning landslides systems, conducting forensic analysis based on detailed 
damage information collected by the information system after event occurrence. 
Keywords. Early warning system, forensic analysis techniques, landslides 
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1. Introduction and scope 
Improvement of landslide risk management is often reactive in the meaning that the 
process of improving the management is driven through major landslide events. 
Throughout the history, adverse events and mishaps has gradually initiated 
improvements in legislation and in risk management. 
Landslide mitigation and preparedness activities may be informed and driven by the 
previously occurred events. Review of well-documented, major landslide events 
influencing transportation infrastructure might provide important input to planning of 
mitigation and preparedness. Especially useful: causal analysis of what went wrong, but 
also analysis of what went right.  
Early warning systems (EWSs) have been defined [1] as “a set of capacities needed 
to generate and disseminate timely and meaningful warning information to enable 
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individuals, communities and organization, threatened by a hazard to prepare and to act 
appropriately and in sufficient time to reduce losses”. They must comprise four elements: 
risk knowledge, monitoring and warning services, dissemination and communication, 
and response capability [2]. 
2. Background 
The mainland of Norway (Scandinavian Peninsula) covers an area of 324 000 km2, with 
more than 490 000 km of rivers and streams and around 250 000 lakes. The country has 
large climatic contrasts, from maritime to continental climate, because of rugged 
topography that causes large local differences. The average annual precipitation is about 
1400 mm, of which about one-third is snow. The precipitation distribution is non-
uniform. In Western Norway, annual precipitation may exceed 5000mm and daily values 
of 70 mm are not uncommon. In the east, some valleys annually receive less than 300 
mm. 
Rainfall- and snowmelt-induced landslides are triggered by water. Intense or long-
duration water supply, caused by rain and/or snowmelt, increases the water content in 
the soil or snow. The cohesiveness of soil or snow particles decreases with higher water 
content, increasing the risk for mass transportation. Not only steep natural slopes covered 
by loose Quaternary sediments, but also gentle slopes covered by snow as well as 
modified slopes and filling along roads and railways are especially exposed to these kinds 
of hazards. 
Climate scenarios for Norway indicate an increased occurrence of extreme weather, 
and intense precipitation is also expected to increase especially in the coastal areas of 
Norway [3]. Higher temperatures have led to earlier spring floods, and there is a tendency 
to increased frequency of rain floods. Future projections show that rain flood magnitude 
will increase, while snowmelt floods will decrease over time. More frequent and stronger 
intense rainfall events may in the future create specific challenges in small, steep rivers 
and in urban areas. Weather conditions are main triggers of certain types of landslides 
and snow avalanches; therefore, changes in climate may affect their future frequency. 
The risk of slush-flows will increase and may occur in areas where they have not 
occurred previously [4]. 
2.1.  Types of warnings in Norway 
The daily landslide hazard assessment is performed by a forecaster who uses forecasted 
thresholds, forecasted hydrometeorological parameters, information from real-time 
observations, knowledge on historical events and regional susceptibility, and personal 
experience. The daily landslide assessment routine is summarized in Figure 1 and 
includes the following phases: 
• Weather forecast, also as input for the hydrological model; 
• Model run, forecasted hydro-meteorological parameters, forecasted threshold; 
• Collection of real-time data; 
• Interpretation of model results and use of additional information from simulated 
hydro-meteorological parameters, i.e. snow and groundwater conditions; 
• Analysis of forecasted thresholds also corrected with susceptibility information; 
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• Preparation of forecast information and warning messages with description of 
possible events and expected impact; 
• Communication and dissemination of messages to warn the public and local 
authorities; 
Type of warnings in Norway:  
• General landslide warning issued by NVE: Regional scale warning based on 
precipitation (threshold-based). Increased awareness regional scale. See 
Figure 1. 
• Slope specific landslide warning systems, such as e.g. for the unstable rock area 
"Veslemannen" 
• Specific warnings after observations; e.g. after train inspections after severe 
weather. Warning issued after inspection of route; 3 possibilities: 
o No restrictions 
o Reduced speed 
o Damage detected, railway closed 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of the elements involved in the issuing of warnings for soil slides and slush flows in 
Norway [5]. 
2.2.  Modes of malfunctioning of road or railway lines due to landslides 
Every year a number of incidents and accidents related to slope failures impact the roads 
and railways in Norway. These can be rock falls, landslides in natural or engineered 
slopes, or failure of road or rail embankments. 
Negative impacts of landslides hitting road and railway include accidents, damage 
to infrastructure or to components of the infrastructure, delays and malfunctioning of the 
transportation network, resulting in economic consequences. An important step in risk 
assessment and forensic analyses of landslide events step is to identify undesirable events 
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and to describe how landslides may lead to malfunctioning of road and railways and how 
it endangers life and health. 
• Damage of transportation line: derailment; traffic accidents 
• Blocking of transportation line: derailment and traffic accidents  
• Direct hit of cars by landslides 
• Landslides destroying infrastructure assets:  
o clogging of culvert leading to water accumulation and embankment 
failure 
o collapse of contact wire due to landslide 
Table 1 present the modes of malfunctioning of road or railway lines due to 
landslides in Norway. 
 
Table 1. Modes of malfunctioning of road or railway lines due to landslides in Norway. 
Description of event Description of direct impact Indirect impacts 
Landslide hit road or railway 
line 
Material destructions of the line Delays - Derailment (if not 
detected timely) with potential 
human injuries and fatalities 
 Blocking of the transportation 
line 
Delays - Derailment (if not 
detected timely) with potential 
human injuries and fatalities 
Landslide hit vehicles on the 
transportation line 
Material damages to vehicles 
 




Clogging of culvert Water accumulation and 
ultimately embankment failure 
Collapse of contact wire Loss of power supply 
Deterioration of system
3. Methodology 
3.1. Back analysis of historic events 
This technique is applied to single historic events. It has three main steps: 
• Thorough description of the event, paying attention to key decisions made 
before the occurrence and to key pre-events (natural and man-made). If the 
event produced consequences, the description should include not only the 
decisions and pre-events related to the hazard, but also to the exposed elements. 
• Reconstruct a timeline of pre-events and decisions leading to the hazardous 
event. 
• Translate the timeline of pre-events and decisions into an event tree. 
• Identify the "weakest" nodes in the tree which could have led to a reduction of 
the hazard or of the consequences. 
3.2. Fault trees and Success trees Analyses 
A fault tree is a top-down logical diagram that shows the relationships between a critical 
event and its causal events. Success tree analysis (STA), which is the counterpart of FTA, 
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is a logical diagram that shows the relationships and combination of the causal events to 
attain a positive event (wanted successful condition). 
3.2.1. Fault tree analysis (FTA) 
The main elements of a fault tree are: 
• The top event, which describes the critical system event (unwanted fault 
condition). 
• Basic events, which are the lowest level of identified causal events. 
• Logic gates. The gates are OR or AND logic operators, which provide the 
relations between the top event and the basic events. 
A fault tree analysis is the qualitative and quantitative analyses which can be 
performed on a fault tree. 
This analysis consists of five steps: 
1. Definition of the problem, the system and boundary conditions for the analysis. 
2. Building of the fault tree. 
3. Identifying minimal cut sets. 
4. Qualitative analysis of the fault tree. 
5. Quantitative analysis of the fault tree. 
3.2.2. Application examples of fault trees to landslides in the literature 
Several examples can be found in the literature of fault trees applied to landslides. 
Figure 2 present the fault tree diagram to categorize human errors in slope 
construction [5] 
 
Figure 2. Theoretical framework to categorize human errors in slope construction [5]. 
L. Pedroni et al. / Applicability of Forensic Analysis Techniques2624
3.2.3. Success tree analysis (STA) 
Success tree analysis analyses what combined events brings to a positive output. What 
went right to prevent human casualties? 
Success tree analysis has not been found in the available literature. Two case study 
are presented in this paper to illustrate STA application to landslides. 
4. Case study 
Two case study are presented and analyzed with STA in this paper. Both case study 
occurred in Norway. 
4.1. Closure of railway line 
This first case study describes a series of events that combined stopped a train just in 
time to prevent a life treating catastrophe. 
4.1.1. Description of case – What happened? 
A heavy rain event combined with snow melting, had produced the complete erosion of 
a railroad embankment, leaving the rails without support. Table 2 present the time line 
analysis backwards in time. 
 
Table 2. Time line analysis of the specific event; backwards in time. 
Time Event 
Saturday 21 April, 17.00 The railway line "Nordlandsbanen" was closed for traffic between 
Mosjøen and Drevvatn.
Saturday 21 April, 16.45 The loss of the railway substructure was detected by the driver of a 
passenger train from NSB (Norwegian state railways), who managed 
to stop on time and notified the management of NSB.
Saturday 21 April, before 16.45 The material comprising the railway substructure slipped out. The 
landslide occurred at the stretch Mosjøen-Drevvatn, 30 km north of 
Mosjøen. Bane NOR (the state-owned company responsible for the 
Norwegian national railway infrastructure) stated the following cause: 
A slush slide has carried trees and branches, sealed a larger concrete 
slab. A lot of water accumulated after a period with rapid snow melting. 
The accumulated water washed out the substructure over a stretch of 
40 meters, and up to 10 m high.
Saturday 21 April, morning. The entire stretch from Steinkjer to Fauske was inspected due to the 
landslide warning at the highest warning level. During inspection, 
accumulated water was discovered at a location at the stretch Mosjøen-
Drevvatn, 30 km north of Mosjøen. Bane NOR lowered the allowed 
train speed of the stretch to 40km/h.
Friday 20 April Emergency group in the municipality arranged a meeting. The 
preparedness was increased.
Thursday 19 April Local emergency management and the main rescue center were 
gathered and went through the plans and conducted a risk assessment. 
Implementation of emergency preparedness measures at the road and 
rail authorities.
Thursday 19 April NVE issues snow avalanche (and landslide) warning at the highest 
warning level (5) at Helgeland and Svartisen
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Table 2. (continued) Time line analysis of the specific event; backwards in time. 
Time Event 
Thursday 19 April Weather forecast: heavy precipitation (up to 80 mm), mild weather and 
wind
Background situation: Large amount of snow accumulated in the mountains through cold and 
dry periods in February and March.
 
4.1.2. Success tree description of the case 
The success event tree diagram for this case is presented in Figure 2. 
The most important (positive) events that have helped to finally stop the train in 
time:  
• Earlier, a special inspection has been done because the NVE had issues snow 
avalanche (and landslide) warning at the highest warning level (5) for the 
region. 
• During this special inspection, inspectors have observed important volumes of 
water ponding nearby structures supporting the railway. 
• Inspectors decided to reduce the velocity on the rails. 
• The driver was alert and with a low velocity. This have allowed the driver to 
see the affected area and to stop the train in time to prevent a life treating 
situation. 
4.2. False warning and evacuation, Veslemannen, Møre og Romsdal County, Norway. 
A second case study describing a repetitive situation of false warning from the early 
warning system for rock avalanche in a valley coming from the "Mannen" mountain. 
4.2.1. Description of case. 
"Mannen" is a mountain at 1294m in the Romsdal Valley, characterized by a distinctive 
mountain-needle. The mountain is unstable, and experts fear a major landslide, up to 100 
million m³. A part of the landslide of 2-3 million m³ might cross the valley floor and hit 
buildings, railroads and the European road, E136. The river Rauma can also be dammed 
with danger of flooding. The mountain has since 2009 been monitored. The Norwegian 
national contingency plan for rock avalanches defines four hazard levels classified by 
the rate of movement in the rock slope: 
• low / green, 
• moderate / yellow, 
• high / orange, and 
• extreme / red constituting the avalanche alert, see Figure 4. 
Figure 4 presents an schematic representation of the expected development of a rock 
avalanche, from the Norwegian national contingency plan for rock avalanches. 
The hazard levels express increasing likelihood of a rock avalanche. The monitoring 
center determines at any time the hazard level for the monitored mountain parties and 
report changes in hazard levels to all emergency operators, with four preparedness levels 
corresponding to the hazard levels. 
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 Figure 3. Success event tree diagram for the stopped train case. 
L. Pedroni et al. / Applicability of Forensic Analysis Techniques 2627
 Figure 4. Schematic representation of the expected development of a rock avalanche, from the Norwegian 
national contingency plan for rock avalanches [7].  
 
In autumn 2014 some major movements in a demarcated area of 4000 m2 at 1100 
to 1200 metres altitude were detected. Some information attains the media and the 
incident escalated due to internal competition between media companies, which 
envisioned the possibility of a direct transfer of the avalanche incident. The mayor 
expressed that the media coverage was exaggerated, and that there was no risk to life and 
health after the evacuation was conducted. A few months later, the evacuated residents 
were allowed to move back home, after movements in the mountains had stabilized. 
Although the rock avalanche did not happen, the incident had negative consequences 
for the evacuees. Economic impact and others, non-quantifiable impacts such as impacts 
associated with the feeling of insecurity in everyday life and uncertainty about long-term 
perspective on the future. 
The events also had major impacts on the railway, especially on the freight transport. 
The events have also created uncertainty about new closures of the railway and long-
term effects for freight transport. 
Establishing thresholds for parameters to define hazard levels is very demanding and 
associated with large uncertainties. The thresholds are set for parameters describing the 
speed of movement in the mountainside, based on the experience from other, monitored 
rock avalanches. Although the avalanche development follows the same overall pattern, 
local conditions will be crucial for the timing and values of threshold for the different 
hazard levels. In addition, there are uncertainties related to the development of the 
weather situation. The thresholds must be balanced between a conservative treatment of 
uncertainties to ensure the security of the population and the disadvantages associated 
with unnecessary evacuations. In the long term, repeated unnecessary evacuations may 
lead to a loss of confidence in the warning system for the population. This confidence is 
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a critical element in the system, in order to be able to complete future evacuation(s). 
Repeated incidents with unnecessary evacuation may also lead to loss of reputation for 
the involved geologists. 
There is a need for improved predictions of timing of the rock avalanches, through: 
• Improved models for prediction of timing of rock avalanches. The available 
models (i.e. the inverse velocity model) predicted that a rock avalanche was 
short ahead in time; obviously, these models were insufficient for the analysis 
of the timing of the avalanche.  
• A calibration of the threshold for early warning is needed. Establishing and 
calibration of thresholds is an important part of the warning system.   
After the first evacuation in 2014, a new system of monitoring was established. The 
surveillance system consisted of radar, quake measurements and powerful tension legs, 
which in total gives a good overview and control of the situation.  
Final Note: by the end of September 2018, the hazard level was red and families 
living in the areas exposed to the potential landslide have been evacuated for the 4th time 
in 2018. 
4.2.2. Success tree description. 
The success event tree diagram for this case is presented in Figure 5. 
The most important (positive) events that have helped to evacuate the valley to 
prevent a life treating situation:  
• Early warning system in place with adequate surveillance 
• Professionals and adequate Thresholds increase the hazard level 
• Increase in the hazard level (to red) 
• Population evacuation and ban across the area 
• No life is exposed to a possible avalanche 
The success tree diagram (Figure 5) put in evidence an event that can change from 
positive to negative if the population is finally affected by the repeated evacuations. 
5. Concluding remarks 
Gaps and needs identified in research projects are listed below. They include the need 
for:  
• Improvement of guidelines, as well as implementation of codes and guidelines  
• Need for more data and systems for collection of data: 
o Systematic collection in databases, e.g. public database for rock falls and 
landslides at SGI (Swedish Geotechnical Society),  
o Access to more accurate and timely information,  
o Improved resolution 
• More extensive landslide hazard evaluation and mapping, which are actively 
taken into account in area and urban planning 
• Improvement of organizational aspects, co-operation and co-operation 
procedures and communication systems, e.g. 
o Clarification of responsibility for inspections and maintenance  
o Conduction of design and construction of slopes in an effective and 
sustainable manner.  
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 Figure 5. Success event tree diagram for false warning and evacuation.. 
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• Training and education, e.g. concerning laws and regulations, technical risks 
in spatial planning and effect of climate change. 
 
Figure 6 presents The ISO 31000 risk management framework. 
 
Figure 6. The ISO 31000 risk management framework 
 
The findings organized per step in the risk management process (Figure 6). 
5.1. Establishing the Context: Legal and regulatory requirements, organizational 
aspects  
Risk management starts with defining objectives, and external and internal factors that 
may influence success in achieving those objectives. Risk management practices are 
influenced by legal and regulatory requirements as well as by policies, standards and 
guidelines.  
• Improvement in legislation (technical requirement with regard to design/codes, 
requirement to procedures/work flows, requirement to risk analysis, clearer 
distribution of responsibilities, avoid formulations that allow subjective 
interpretation)  
• Need for improved systems for control and management/organizational aspects, 
clarification of roles and responsibility for inspections and maintenance, 
improved guidelines co-operation procedures and communication systems  
• Improved risk awareness (knowledge and further education, training and 
educational interventions)  
• Improved systems for data collection and better access to data e.g. as input to 
improved risk assessment, monitoring and warning and more accurate and 
timely information for the affected areas. Need for improved coordination of 
data on many levels, for example: improved measurements, improved records 
related to events, enhanced list of measures, enhanced cooperation on mapping 
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of risk, standardization of format and presentation of data, improved 
information sharing.  
5.2. Risk identification  
Risk identification requires the application of systematic processes to understand what 
could happen, how, when and why. It involves the identification of risk sources, events, 
their causes and potential consequences. Risk identification may involve historical data, 
theoretical analysis, expert opinions, and stakeholder's objectives.  
• Better access to data from previous events 
5.3. Risk Assessment 
Risk analysis is concerned with developing an understanding of each risk, its 
consequences, and the likelihood of those consequences. Disaster loss- and damage data 
are essential when exploring landslide risk.  
• Further need for mapping (hazard and vulnerability).   
• Assessment of change in risk pattern including effect of climate changes  
• Identification and assessment of uncertainties within models for risk 
identification and risk assessment, including effect of resolution. Neglecting 
uncertainties may lead to underestimation of the landslide risk. 
5.4. Risk evaluation 
The purpose of risk evaluation is to assist in making decisions, based on the outcomes of 
risk analysis, about which risks need treatment and the priority for treatment 
implementation.  Damage data may be applied as the basis for establishing explicit risk 
acceptance criteria, or as a basis for assessing whether estimated risk is acceptable or if 
there are needs for risk treatment.  Damage data will also be input to cost-benefit 
calculations. The need for better access to data from previous events is thus also reflected 
within this stage of the risk management process. 
5.5. Risk Treatment 
Risk treatment is the process to modify risk. It can involve measures to avoid activities 
that give rise to risk, removing the risk source, changing the likelihood, changing the 
consequences, or accepting the possibility of loss, with or without transferring the risk 
to an insurance company.   
Need for:  
• Improved land use planning, actively taking hazard evaluations and mapping 
into account  
• Improved methods for monitoring and warning  
• Procedures for selection of mitigation measures: structural and non-structural 
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5.6. Communication and consultation and Monitoring and review 
Considerable iterations are required between the previously described steps and between 
the continuously applied elements of communication and consultation and monitoring 
and review. 
There is continual communication with external and internal stakeholders, where 
practicable, to gain their input to the process and their ownership of the outputs. It is also 
important to understand stakeholders’ objectives, so that their involvement can be 
planned and their views can be taken into account in setting risk criteria.  
Monitoring and review involve environmental scanning by risk owners, control 
assurance, taking on board new information that becomes available, and learning lessons 
about risks and controls from the analysis of successes and failures.  
• Challenges related to organizational aspects including inter-institutional 
organization, co-operation and co-operation procedures and communication 
systems.  
• Focus on communication, across disciplines, with policymakers, with 
stakeholders and with general public 
• Cooperation between the Nordic countries on common problems. 
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